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Abstract 
This article examines whether the judges of the French Constitutional Court demonstrated 
partisanship when ruling on the validity of the elections to the lower house of the French 
Parliament between 1958 and 2005. It uses a new dataset on the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court which takes into account the characteristics of the controverted parliamentary elections. 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court are found to be biased against far-right candidates. 
However, the judges are also found to display some form of independence vis-à-vis the 
government since they do not favor candidates from the ruling party when they render their 
decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
In a series of studies, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) argue that British common law 
provides a legal framework which is more favorable to economic growth than French civil law.
 1 
In particular, they contend that property rights are better protected under British common law 
than under French civil law because the former grants judges higher independence from the 
polity than the latter. This makes judges in British common law countries more likely to prevent 
the government from seizing private property through eminent domain. In this respect, 
Berkowitz and Clay (2005, 2006) provide some empirical support for the claims of La Porta et 
al. (1997, 1998, 1999) by showing that judicial independence is low in US states that initially 
had a civil law regime. 
However, studies by Hanssen (2004), Iaryczower et al. (2002) and Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen (1997, 2001) consider that judicial independence is not necessarily lower in civil law 
than in common law countries. Instead, they argue that the independence of the judiciary mainly 
depends on the judges’ appointment process to the courts, on the length of the courts’ tenure and 
on political circumstances. In particular, Hanssen (2004) shows that independent judiciaries are 
more likely to emerge in political environments where major differences exist between party 
platforms and where there is a high degree of competition between parties.  
This paper seeks to examine the claim that judicial independence in countries with a French 
civil law regime is low by focusing on the rulings of the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional 
Council – CC), the French constitutional court. Its approach however differs from most of the 
                                                 
1 La Porta et al. (2008) provide additional explanations for the higher growth rates of common law countries. They 
notably argue that common law is more flexible than civil law, and as a result, provide a freer and safer contracting 
environment for business organization. This explanation has however been criticized by Lamoreux and Rosenthal 
(2005).   3
research on judicial independence, e.g., Gely and Spiller (1990, 1992), Spiller and Gely (1992), 
Segal and Spaeth (2002), because it does not focus on the judiciary's willingness to rescind non-
constitutional decisions.  
Instead, this article exploits the fact that the CC judges have ruled on the validity of 
parliamentary elections since the creation of the court in 1958, when the Fifth French Republic 
was established.
2 It would seem that the positive political theories of court rulings on non-
constitutional issues and on the validity of elections are quite different. Judicial decisions can be 
reversed when courts rule on non-constitutional matters. However, if the judges pick the winner 
and the loser(s) in an election, there is not much that the latter can do to overturn the judges’ 
decision, apart from starting a popular uprising. 
As such, if judicial independence in countries with a French civil law regime is low, as La 
Porta et al. (2008) suggest, it may be hypothesized that the CC judges are explained by the party 
currently in power: the CC judges would validate the controverted elections of the 
representatives from the ruling party and/or invalidate the victories of candidates from the 
opposition parties. Conversely, if the CC judges are independent, the rulings of the CC judges 
may be based on purely legal and apolitical criteria and/or may be explained by the political 
                                                 
2 There are several countries where constitutional court judges may be called upon to render rulings on the validity 
of elections. Recent examples include the US Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore decision in the 2000 US presidential 
election and the Mexican Supreme Court’s ruling following the 2006 presidential election in Mexico. Hasen (2004) 
reviews the literature on the Bush v. Gore decision. See Giordano (2006) for a discussion of the 2006 Mexican 
presidential election.    4
biases of the CC judges, since all the CC judges have been nominated by politicians, and since 
some CC judges were even former politicians.
 3 
This paper thus assesses the CC’s judicial independence by examining its rulings on the 
validity of the elections of the representatives elected to the lower house of the French 
Parliament between 1958 and 2005. During this period, the CC pronounced 2229 rulings 
concerning electoral races in 12 general parliamentary elections and in many by-elections
4. 
These rulings constitute the basis for this paper’s dataset, which also comprises information on 
the CC judges and on the characteristics of the elections whose validity was questioned, e.g., the 
difference in the number of votes between the two front-running candidates and the political 
affiliation of the elected candidate.  
It must be noted that the vote of each CC judge remains unknown and that only the final 
decision of the CC is made public. In spite of this limitation, our results provide evidence that the 
rulings of the CC judges are biased against far-right candidates, whose elections are almost 
always annulled when the CC finds evidence of irregularities.  
In the French political context, the partisanship displayed by the CC judges against far-
right candidates may be given a rational-choice explanation. First, all the CC judges have been 
appointed either by mainstream right-wing or mainstream left-wing politicians, who oppose the 
                                                 
3 Franck (2009) shows that the CC’s decisions on constitutional matters are influenced by the specific political 
circumstances at the time of each ruling: CC judges are more likely to render independent decisions when the polity 
is fragmented between left-wing and right-wing parties. See also Stone (1992) on this issue. 
4 While the rulings of the CC on the validity of elections never entailed a change in the political majority in 
Parliament, they may have consequences on the legitimacy of the elected candidate and on the redistributive policies 
undertaken at the local level. Studies on the relationship between the composition of the legislature and public 
spending include Del Rossi and Inman (1999), Bradbury and Crain (2001) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001).   5
far-right. This observation suggests that CC judges would be biased against far-right candidates. 
More generally, it reflects the general consensus in mainstream French society, from which all 
the CC judges are drawn, that the far-right is politically "beyond the pale".
5 Second, self-
interested CC judges, who care about the preservation of their prerogatives, know they have 
nothing to fear from far-right politicians. This is because far-right candidates could only threaten 
the CC’s independence if they became junior or senior partners in governmental coalitions after 
the parliamentary elections. But far-right politicians have never exercised any political 
responsibility at the national level since 1958. Hence, our results suggest that a combination of 
political ideology and self-interest on the part of the CC’s judges explains why they rendered 
partisan rulings against far-right candidates, but not against candidates of other parties. But they 
also suggest that the CC judges are also independent from the polity since their decisions are not 
influenced by the ruling party when they render their decisions. 
The rest of this article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the powers of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel (CC). Section 3 presents the data while Section 4 deals with the econometric 
methodology. Section 5 analyzes the estimation results and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix 
provides excerpts of CC judgments on controverted elections. 
2. The powers of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
Articles 56 to 63 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic and the 7 November 1958 
Ordonnance nº58-1067 define the organization and the main functions of the CC. In this section, 
we discuss how they shape the appointments of the CC judges and the validation process of 
elections. 
                                                 
5 Since 1958, the mainstream right-wing parties have systematically refused alliances with the far-right, in local and 
in national elections. The seminal work on the different ideological groups of the French Right is Rémond (1982).   6
2.1 The appointment of the CC judges 
Nine judges sit on the CC’s bench. Their term lasts nine years and is not renewable. Three 
judges, including the CC president
6, are nominated by the President of the French Republic, 
three by the President of the Assemblée Nationale, the lower house of Parliament, and three by 
the President of the Sénat, the upper house of Parliament. Every three years, three judges leave 
the bench and are replaced by three newcomers. 
In addition to the nine judges, former Presidents of the French Republic are members of the 
CC in their own right. However, only three sat. President Vincent Auriol joined the CC in 1958 
but boycotted its proceedings after 1962 to protest against the amendment to the French 
Constitution providing for the election of the President of the Republic by the people in a general 
election. In the last quarter of 2005, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was the first former 
President since Vincent Auriol to attend some of the proceedings of the CC, but not any dealing 
with the elections to the lower house of Parliament. President Jacques Chirac also joined the CC 
in the fall of 2007. 
Between 1958 and 2005, five women and sixty men sat on the CC’s bench
7. Even though 
no qualification is required to become a CC judge, many were lawyers, high-level civil servants, 
and professors of law or political science. There were also several former parliamentarians, from 
both the lower and the upper houses of Parliament. It must be noted that CC judges cannot be at 
the same time government ministers or members of Parliament, and more generally, cannot run 
in any election.  
                                                 
6 In addition to his duties as a judge, the CC president is entrusted with the administration of the CC. 
7 Detailed biographical information on each CC judge is available upon request.    7
Between 1958 and 2005 (i.e., the end of our sample), all the politicians who nominated CC 
judges belonged to the mainstream left-wing or to the mainstream right-wing parties. This is 
shown in Figure 1, which provides the relative shares of judges appointed by mainstream right-
wing and mainstream left-wing politicians sitting on the CC’s bench in the years when general 
parliamentary election were held. Figure 1 shows that, since 1958, the CC has been dominated 
by judges appointed by mainstream-wing politicians, except between 1988 and 2001. This 
observation suggests that the political affiliation of the politicians who appointed the CC judges, 
as well as the political party in power at the time of the rulings, should be taken into account to 
explain the CC’s decisions on controverted elections.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
2.2 The validation process of elections 
The CC’s competence for judging the validity of the parliamentary elections is defined by 
Chapters 6 and 7 of the 7 November 1958 Ordonnance nº58-1067
8. These laws prevent the CC 
from judging the validity of all the elections. It can only investigate the lawfulness of an election 
when a complaint is filed. But the procedure for filing such a complaint must obey specific rules. 
A complaint is only valid if it is filed by a candidate who ran in the controverted election or by a 
voter who was registered to vote in the election
9. The CC can thus dismiss requests from 
government ministers or civil servants who question the validity of the election if they were not 
themselves candidates or did not live in the constituency. Complaints that are submitted more 
                                                 
8 Before the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, and the ensuing creation of the CC, the validation of the 
elections of representatives to the lower and upper houses of Parliament was decided by the elected representatives 
themselves. Charnay (1965) discusses the problems that this procedure entailed.  
9 Article 33 of 7 November 1958 Ordonnance nº58-1067 portant Loi organique sur le Conseil Constitutionnel.   8
than ten days after election day are also not accepted. Moreover, no one is eligible to appeal 
against the CC’s decisions, neither to the CC itself nor to any other jurisdiction
10.  
When ruling on the validity of elections, the CC judges often rely on Article 38 of the 7 
November 1958 Ordonnance nº58-1067, which allows them to ignore irregularities if they wish 
to do so, following the legal principle of interpretation “de minimis non curat praetor”
11: 
irregularities are considered irrelevant unless they change the outcome of the election. In 
practice, Article 38 has led CC judges to pay particular attention to the size of the vote 
differential between the two front-running candidates. They have thus upheld elections by 
arguing that the vote differential between the two leading candidates is sufficiently large for the 
irregularities to have no effect on the outcome of the electoral contest. In what follows, we 
examine whether the vote differential, which is a non-partisan and objective criterion, indeed 
explains whether elections are upheld or cancelled.  
3. The data 
In this study, we build a new dataset comprising the decisions of the CC in the 12 general 
elections and in the many by-elections to the lower house of Parliament between 1958 and 2005. 
In what follows, we discuss the construction of our variables, which are presented in Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 1] [Insert Table 2] 
3.1. The decisions of the CC 
From 4 December 1958 until 1 October 2005, the CC rendered 2229 decisions concerning 
the French parliamentary elections, including by-elections. Only 1102 concerned the validity of 
                                                 
10 Article 62 of the French Constitution. 
11 The judge does not deal with unimportant things.   9
elections. The remaining 1127 decisions were not decisions on controverted elections but 
sanctions against candidates who failed to abide by the procedures concerning the elections of 
representatives. These decisions followed the recommendations of the governmental agency in 
charge of checking electoral spending, known as Commission Nationale des Comptes de 
Campagnes et de Financements Politiques (CNCCFP), which was created in 1990. The 
sanctioned candidates failed to provide a detailed account of their campaign spending or spent 
more than permitted.  
Excluding the rulings that followed the CNCCFP’s recommendations, as well as all the 
complaints that did not follow the appropriate procedures which were discussed in Section 2.2, 
we are left with a sample of 999 valid requests questioning the fairness of elections. The CC 
acknowledged the existence of irregularities in 411 of these 999 electoral races, but only 
cancelled 56 of them. We therefore create the following two qualitative variables: the 
Irregularities variable takes the value 1 if the CC acknowledged that irregularities occurred 
during a given election, and the Cancel variable takes the value 1 if the election is cancelled by 
the CC. Table 3 provides the number of valid requests reviewed by the CC between 1958 and 
2005, as well as the number of elections with irregularities and the number of cancelled 
elections.  
[Insert Table 3] 
In Table 3, we notice that the CC only cancelled one of the 55 controverted by-elections 
whose validity it reviewed. This observation suggests using a restricted sample that includes the 
general elections but excludes the by-elections in order to obtain a robustness check on the 
regression results. The sample restricted to the sole 12 general elections contains 944 elections, 
including 388 elections with irregularities and 55 cancelled elections.   10
3.2. The CC judges  
Since the CC judges are appointed by politicians, we build several variables to assess the 
influence of politics on the CC’s rulings. We create the Judges_appointed_RW variable to assess 
the share of judges appointed by mainstream right-wing politicians who sit on the CC’s bench at 
the time of each ruling. We also take into account the shares of CC judges who are former left-
wing and former right-wing politicians (Judges_Former_Left-wing_Politicians and 
Judges_Former_Right-wing_Politicians). These variables are of a political nature and should 
only be significant if the CC judges demonstrate partisanship when they rule on the controverted 
elections.  
We also compute the share of judges who are jurists (Judges_Jurists), i.e., law professors 
and lawyers, as well as the share of former high-level civil servants (Judges_Civil_Servants). It 
may be hypothesized that judges with these two backgrounds may be more accurate in the 
application of election laws, and as such, non-partisan.  
3.3 The French polity 
The decisions of the judges may not only be explained by their background, but also by the 
situation of the French polity at the time of the rulings. We thus create the RW_government 
qualitative variable which equals 1 if the French government was dominated by mainstream 
right-wing parties.  
In addition, it may be hypothesized that CC judges are more willing to cancel elections 
when the polity is divided between left-wing and right-wing parties
12. Such a hypothesis follows 
Iaryczower et al. (2002), who argue that judges in constitutional courts are more likely to rule in 
                                                 
12 Duverger (1986), among others, discusses how the constitutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic may entail a 
division of the polity between left-wing and right-wing parties.   11
an independent manner when the polity is fragmented between opposing parties, since the 
politicians’ ability to pressure the judges is then weakened. We thus create two qualitative 
variables to assess the extent of the polity’s fragmentation when the CC judges rule on the 
controverted elections.  
We create the Cohabitation variable, which takes the value 1 if the Prime Minister and the 
majority of the representatives in the lower house of Parliament on the one hand, and the 
President of the Republic on the other hand, do not belong to the same party. Such a situation, 
called cohabitation, occurred three times between 1958 and 2005: Socialist President François 
Mitterrand (1981-1995) had two right-wing Prime Ministers, Jacques Chirac (1986-1988) and 
Edouard Balladur (1993-1995), while President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) had Socialist leader 
Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) as Prime Minister
13.  
Our second variable to  assess the fragmentation of the polity focuses on the division 
between the upper and lower houses of the Parliament. We define the Senat variable as taking 
the value 1 each time the Sénat, the upper house of Parliament, opposed the policies of the 
government. Since the beginning of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, the upper house of 
Parliament has been dominated by right-wing parties. Therefore the upper house of Parliament 
opposed the policies of the government each time left-wing parties controlled a majority of the 
                                                 
13 While the President of the French Republic’s veto power does not allow him to unilaterally rescind legislation that 
he opposes, he still wields enough influence to partially disrupt the policies undertaken by his own Prime Minister. 
Indeed, the veto power of the French President is restricted by Article 10 of the French Constitution which states 
that the French President has to promulgate a law passed by the Parliament in the fifteen days that follow the vote. 
In this time period, he can ask the Parliament to re-discuss the law or file a request to the CC. But if the Parliament 
votes the same text or if the CC rules that the law is in conformity with the constitution, the President has to comply 
and promulgate the law.   12
seats in the Assemblée Nationale, the lower house of Parliament (1981-1986, 1988-1993, 1997-
2002). But the Sénat also opposed the policies of President Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969), since 
senators first opposed his handling of the war in Algeria, and then his successful drive to amend 
the French Constitution in order to provide for the election of the President of the Republic by 
the people in a general election.  
3.4. The characteristics of the elections 
We also collected information on the characteristics of the elections whose validity was 
questioned. We construct the Vote_Differential variable as the differential in the number of votes 
between the winner of the election and the candidate who came second. We expect to find a 
negative relationship between this variable and the annulment of elections. This is because the 
CC often justifies its decision to uphold the result of an election with irregularities by arguing 
that the vote differential between the two front-running candidates is sufficiently large for the 
irregularities not to have any influence on the outcome.  
In addition, we noted if the person who filed a request to the CC was a candidate, in which 
case we took into account his political affiliation, or whether he was a voter living in the 
constituency (Request_Voter). We also take into account the political affiliations of the 
candidates who won the controverted elections. 
We further included in our regressions several variables to control for the particular 
situations that result from the specificities of the French electoral system. Except in a couple of 
instances which we discuss below, the French electoral system has followed a two-round 
majority voting procedure with a single representative elected in each constituency. Candidates 
running in the French parliamentary elections can be elected in the first round if they obtain more 
than 50% of the votes (1_round). If not, a second round is held with all the candidates that gain a   13
predetermined percentage of the votes. This threshold changed over the years. It was equal to 5% 
in 1958 and was progressively increased so that it amounted to 12.5% of the votes in 2002. 
Hence there may be more than two candidates vying to be elected on the second round 
(More2candidates). But there were also elections with only one candidate in the second round 
(1candidate_2nd_round). This odd situation resulted from a couple of circumstances: (1) there 
were only two candidates eligible to run in the second round of the elections, and (2) both of 
them were either left-wing or right-wing. The candidate who obtained the smallest number of 
votes in the first round chose to withdraw his or her candidacy, and the remaining candidate was 
then elected with 100% of the votes
14.  
However, the two-round majority voting procedure was not always applied in French 
parliamentary elections. In 1958, the electoral system was different in Algeria, which was then a 
part of France with representatives elected to the lower and upper houses of Parliament. Algeria 
was divided into 18 constituencies where the electoral procedure followed a one-round party list 
majority rule. The list which would get the highest number of votes would have all its candidates 
elected in Parliament. All these elections are singled out by the qualitative variable Algeria.  
In addition, in 1986, all the French representatives were elected in a one-round party-list 
election under a proportional voting system (1986_elections). From a political perspective, the 
1986 elections were unusual and turned out to be a major success for the far-right Front National 
(FN – National Front). While FN candidates found it hard to win seats in French parliamentary 
elections because of the two-round run-off system, the proportional system provided them in 
1986 with 35 out of 577 seats. Therefore, in order to assess the robustness of our results, we run 
                                                 
14 In that instance, we computed the Vote_Differential variable as the difference in the number of votes between the 
two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the first round.   14
regressions with and without the 22 parliamentary elections whose validity was challenged in 
1986. As an additional robustness check, we test whether the CC judges treat far-right candidates 
differently by running supplementary regressions with the Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right 
variable, which assesses the vote differential between the two-front running candidates in 
elections won by far-right politicians. 
4. Methodology 
In order to identify the characteristics of the elections which the CC cancelled, our 
empirical approach takes into account the two stages of the review process undertaken by the 
CC. First, when a complaint questioning the validity of an election is filed, the CC rules whether 
an irregularity occurred. Second, if the CC acknowledges the existence of an irregularity, it may 
decide to invalidate the election.  
Such a procedure suggests using Heckman (1979)’s two-step approach
15. While the first 
step estimates the probability of irregularity in the sample of controverted elections, the second 
step estimates the probability of cancellation in the sample of electoral races with irregularities.  
In the first step of Heckman’s (1979) estimation procedure, a probit model is used to obtain 
the probability that the CC acknowledges the existence of irregularities in an election  
Irregularities γ γ
'
0 X + = η +         ( 1 )  
where the qualitative variable Irregularities takes the value 1 if the CC judges find irregularities 
in a given election, and  X  is the vector of regressors. From the estimated parameters of the 
probit model, we calculate the estimated hazard rate λ  which is equal to 
                                                 
15 The results we obtained with the Heckman (1979)’s two-step approach are robust to other estimation methods: we 
notably experimented with Tobit and probit models, as well as panel data specifications in order to take into account 
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where X and γ  are respectively the vector of regressors and the vector of parameters in equation 
(1),  () f  is the probability density function of a standard normal variable, and  ( ) F  the 
corresponding cumulative distribution function.  
We can then use λ  to normalize the mean of the true error term to zero, and get consistent 
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where Cancel equals 1 if the CC cancelled the election and 0 otherwise,  1 X  is a vector of 
variables containing information on the CC judges,  2 X  is a vector of data on the characteristics 
of the elections and σ  is the standard deviation of the true error term ε .  
If the associated coefficient to the estimated hazard rate λ  is not statistically significant, 
our specification is not affected by a selection bias. In other words, our specification correctly 
distinguishes between the characteristics of the elections where the CC acknowledges the 
existence of irregularities and the features of the elections that the CC cancels.  
5. Results 
This section analyzes the results of our regressions. Table 4 displays the estimation results 
on our main sample, which comprises all the decisions rendered by the CC judges between 1958 
and 2005. Furthermore, Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide additional regressions to control for the 
robustness of the results in Table 4. Table 5 shows the decisions handed out in the election years 
when a majority of the CC judges were appointed by mainstream right-wing politicians, i.e., 
excluding the elections held between 1988 and 2001. Table 6 provides a robustness check on the 
bias of the CC judges against far-right candidates by including the   16
Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right variable, which assesses the vote differential between the 
two-front running candidates in elections won by far-right candidates. In addition, Table 7 
analyses the characteristics of the CC’s rulings when right-wing governments were in power, i.e., 
between 1958 and 1981, 1986 and 1988, 1993 and 1997, and between 2002 and 2005 (the last 
year in our sample).
16  
In all the Tables, we distinguish between the general and the by-elections, as well as 
between the 1986 and the other parliamentary elections. We also note that the hazard rate λ  is 
insignificant in all the regressions: the estimation of the characteristics of the cancelled elections 
is therefore not affected by a selection bias.  
[Insert Table 4] [Insert Table 5] [Insert Table 6] 
5.1. The characteristics of elections with irregularities 
In order to determine the characteristics of elections where the CC acknowledged the 
existence of irregularities, we analyze the first stage of Heckman (1979)’s two-step regression 
which is shown in the lower part of Tables 4, 5 and 6. The results suggest that the judges’ 
background partially explains their willingness to acknowledge irregularities. However, the 
judges do not display partisanship when they rule that irregularities occurred during an electoral 
campaign. 
More specifically, Tables 4 and 5 show that the background of the CC judges has an impact 
on the probability that irregularities may be found in an election. Table 4 indicates that less 
irregularities are found when more jurists sit on the CC’s bench. But when more civil servants sit 
on the CC’s bench, Table 5 shows that more irregularities are found. However, both results 
should be viewed with caution as they are not robust across all our specifications. In addition, we 
                                                 
16 Regressions analyzing the CC’s decisions under left-wing governments are available upon request.   17
observe in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 that more irregularities are found when a higher share of 
judges appointed by right-wing politicians sit on the CC’s bench, but this result is also not robust 
in all our regressions. This observation may nevertheless suggest that judges appointed by right-
wing politicians are stricter in the application of election laws. 
Still, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the CC judges treat identically the requests 
of politicians from different parties and do not display any partisan bias in the first stage of the 
election review process. Indeed, our regressions show that the CC judges acknowledge the 
existence of irregularities in the elections whose validity is challenged by mainstream left-wing, 
mainstream right-wing and far-right candidates.  
In addition, the Request_Voter variable is never significant in our regressions, thus 
showing that CC does not find any irregularity in the elections whose validity is questioned by 
voters. This result suggests that most voters do not usually have any good reason to dispute the 
legality of the elections and the CC renders a judgment of nonsuit against their requests. It may 
also explain why the CC does not acknowledge the existence of irregularities in elections where 
there are more than two candidates in the second round, as can be seen in Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4. Voters mistakenly believe that elections with more than two candidates in the second 
round are irregular but they are not. 
As such, our results suggest that the CC judges rule sincerely when they acknowledge the 
existence of irregularities, even though they are appointed by politicians and probably have 
political ideas of their own. However, when the judges acknowledge irregularities in an election, 
they do not necessarily annul it because they rely upon the legal principle of interpretation “de 
minimas non curat praetor”, as we discussed above. As a result, the crucial element in the   18
annulment of an election is the CC judges’ assessment of the gravity of the irregularities. In what 
follows, we examine whether such an assessment is influenced by political considerations.  
5.2. The characteristics of cancelled elections 
The upper parts of Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the second stage of Heckman’s 
two-step method where we estimate the probability that an election is cancelled once the CC has 
acknowledged the existence of irregularities. In all the Tables, our results are robust to the 
different specifications and samples: the apolitical factors are shown to hardly have an effect on 
the CC’s decisions while the political factors are seen to have a salient impact.  
Indeed, only one apolitical factor consistently explains the annulment of elections: the 
proportional voting system that was adopted in the 1986 parliamentary elections. As can be seen 
in Table 3, this voting system led to a reduction in the number of constituencies, from 577 to 
104. Fewer constituencies meant that fewer elections could be controverted: only 22 requests 
were filed in 1986, compared to 84.2 on average in the 11 other general elections. Out of these 
22 controverted elections, two elections were cancelled by the CC, i.e., 9% of the requests led to 
cancellations. This is clearly a higher percentage than in the other 11 general elections, where on 
average, only 6.5% of the requests led to annulments. As such, we can explain the significance of 
the apolitical variable 1986_elections by the low number of electoral contests in the 1986 
parliamentary elections.  
More generally, the lack of significance of apolitical variables in our regressions is 
particularly noteworthy for the Vote_Differential variable, which assesses the vote differential 
between the two-front running candidates in a parliamentary election. Indeed, this observation 
suggests that the CC judges do not take into account this objective and non-partisan criterion to 
cancel elections, unlike what they write in their rulings.     19
As a matter of fact, the only variables which are significant across all our regressions in 
explaining the characteristics of the cancelled elections are of a political nature: these are the 
variables which pertain to the party affiliation of the elected candidates. We find in all the Tables 
that an election is more likely to be annulled if the elected candidate hails from the far-right. This 
result is statistically significant at the 1%-level in all our specifications; it holds whether or not 
we include in our sample the 1986 parliamentary elections, which were a major success for the 
far-right. Hence, the minor irregularities that far-right candidates commit are interpreted by the 
CC judges in such a way that their elections are cancelled. Conversely, the victories of 
candidates from the communist party and from the mainstream right-wing parties are likely to be 
upheld, whether or not there is a majority of judges appointed by right-wing politicians sitting on 
the CC’s bench. Thus, the irregularities which communist and mainstream right-wing candidates 
commit, and which are detrimental to the electoral success of far-right candidates, never lead to 
the annulment of elections
17.  
It may be argued that far-right candidates commit more irregularities in tight electoral races 
than the candidates from the other parties, and consequently, that the judges are warranted in 
canceling their elections. Table 6 proves that such an argument is incorrect by showing that an 
objective criterion like the vote differential in elections won by far-right candidates, which is 
assessed by the Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right variable, does not explain the annulment 
of the elections.
18  
                                                 
17 We illustrate this point by providing excerpts of CC decisions 97/2101 and 97/2209. 
18 Additional regressions that are available upon request show that the vote differential is never significant in 
explaining the annulment of the elections, whatever the political affiliation of the winner.   20
Hence our results demonstrate that the decisions of the CC judges are politically motivated. 
At the same time, they show also that the CC judges are independent from the ruling party as can 
be seen in Tables 4 and 5 from the lack of significance of the variables which we use to assess 
political circumstances (RW_government, Senat and Cohabitation). In addition, the CC judges 
who are appointed by mainstream left-wing (respectively, right-wing) politicians are not biased 
against mainstream right-wing (left-wing) candidates. Moreover, the controverted elections of 
communist candidates are usually upheld, even though no communist politician has ever 
appointed a CC judge.
19  
These results can only be explained if we take into account the CC judges’ self-interest in 
relation to the polity. Since 1958, mainstream left-wing and right-wing politicians have usually 
been senior members of government; communist politicians were also junior partners in 
governments led by the mainstream left-wing parties on two occasions (1981-1983 and 1997-
2002). In other words, politicians from the communist, mainstream left-wing and mainstream 
right-wing parties may not win a given general parliamentary election but they may win the next 
one. CC judges would therefore be ill-advised to rule in a partisan manner against politicians 
who may be in power after the next election. As a result, CC judges do not cancel the elections 
of communist and mainstream right-wing politicians, unless they commit irregularities that are 
too obvious
20.  
                                                 
19 These results are shown to be robust in Table 7 where we restrict the sample to the sole decisions rendered under 
right-wing governments. Regressions analyzing the CC’s decisions under left-wing governments, which are 
available upon request, show similar results. 
20 However, it is not clear what an obvious irregularity is for the CC judges, as can be seen from the excerpts of 
decision 97-2113/2119/2146/2154/2234/2235/2242/2243 that are given in the Appendix. In this ruling, the CC 
judges acknowledge that mainstream right-wing politician and incumbent Paris mayor Jean Tibéri tampered with the   21
A similar combination of judicial independence, partisanship and self-interest also explains 
the CC judges’ behavior vis-à-vis far-right candidates. Since all the CC judges have been 
nominated by either mainstream left-wing or mainstream right-wing politicians, who oppose the 
far-right, it is not surprising that they issue rulings which are detrimental to far-right candidates. 
But self-interested CC judges also know that since 1958, far-right politicians have never obtained 
a sufficiently important number of seats in the lower house of Parliament to become junior 
partners in a governmental coalition, let alone to lead a government. Thus the far-right’s inability 
to be a powerful force in French politics explains why CC judges have been able to rule against 
far-right candidates in a partisan manner: they know that they are unlikely to face retaliation 
from far-right politicians in the future. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper assesses the independence of the Conseil Constitutionnel, France’s supreme 
constitutional court, by focusing on its rulings on the validity of elections to the lower house of 
Parliament. We analyze the decisions of the CC between 1958 and 2005 over 999 elections 
whose outcome was challenged by candidates or voters.  
Our estimations show that the CC’s decisions are not based on legal, but on political, 
considerations. For instance, the vote differential between the two front-running candidates is not 
a criterion that influences the CC’s decisions to cancel elections, contrary to what the CC judges 
write in their rulings. However, we also observe that the judges do not display narrow-minded 
partisanship. They do not systematically back candidates from the party of the politicians who 
appointed them. They also display some form of independence vis-à-vis the government: both 
                                                                                                                                                             
poll registers so as to increase his vote share. However, they considered that this interference did not affect the 
outcome of the elections.   22
winners and losers of controverted elections do not benefit from belonging to the ruling party 
when the CC judges issue their rulings. 
Still, we find that the elections of far-right candidates are often cancelled, even though 
there is not any objective criterion to warrant such annulments. This result can easily be 
explained by the CC judges’ political biases and self-interest. On the one hand, CC judges 
certainly share the views of the politicians who appointed them and who were all opponents of 
the far-right. On the other hand, CC judges know that far-right politicians do not have the means 
to significantly threaten their independence and curb their power.  
All in all, this paper suggests that a constitutional court whose judges are nominated by 
politicians may not be the optimal mechanism to deliver an unbiased assessment of the validity 
of elections. It is however unclear which institutional system would provide non-partisan rulings 
on controverted elections. A normative analysis of this issue may therefore be the subject of 
further research. 
Appendix 
In this Appendix, we provide excerpts of judgments rendered by the CC on the validity of 
three parliamentary elections held in 1997 (all translations are ours). In the first decision (97-
2181), a candidate of the far-right Front National contested the validity of the elections, but his 
request was rejected on the grounds that the irregularities that were committed could not have 
had an impact on the outcome of the election. 
In the second decision (97-2209), Front National candidate Jean-Marie Le Chevallier won 
the parliamentary election in Toulon. However, the CC judges considered that he committed 
irregularities which justified the cancellation of his election. In particular, they argued that Jean-
Marie Le Chevallier had spent more than what campaign spending limits in parliamentary   23
elections allowed him, even though he contented that the litigious spending was on the one hand 
paid by his party, and was on the other hand not related to his electoral campaign (See France – 
Ministère de l’intérieur (1997) on campaign spending limits in the 1997 French parliamentary 
elections). In any case, the CC judges’ interpretation of the law in decision 97-2209 was very 
unfavorable to Jean-Marie Le Chevallier.  
It was however very favorable to mainstream right-wing politician Jean Tibéri, who was 
the then mayor of Paris, as well as the political protégé of Jacques Chirac, the former mayor of 
Paris and the then President of the French Republic. Indeed, in decision 97-
2113/2119/2146/2154/2234/2235/2242/2243, the CC judges validated Jean Tibéri’s election, 
even though he tampered with poll registers. They argued that the vote differential between the 
candidates in the second round of the election was higher that the presumed number of 
fraudulent voters. It may be suspected that the CC judges would have rendered a different 
judgment if Jean Tibéri had been a far-right candidate without a powerful political mentor.  
A.1. Excerpt of decision 97-2181 
[Front National candidate] Mr. Chauvet argues that on the first round of the elections held 
on 25 May 1997, two persons entered polling station number 6 in Fleury-les-Aubrais and stole 
all the voting papers with his name, thus preventing him from gaining access to the second 
round; 
These events however occurred 40 minutes before the polls ended; Mr. Chauvet obtained 
80 votes in this polling station; therefore this incident, as blameworthy as it may be, did not 
prevent him from obtaining the 214 votes which he needed to run in the second round; (…).   24
A.2. Excerpt of decision 97-2209 
(….) First, [Front National candidate] Mr. Le Chevallier declared that he spent 161,696 
Francs for his own campaign, instead of having his financial agent pay for this amount; but while 
the candidate can pay some of his campaign spending, this can only be tolerated if this spending 
remains limited; in contrast, Mr. Le Chevallier paid 60% of his total campaign spending and 
therefore violated the second paragraph of article L. 52-4 of the electoral code;  
Second, Mr. Le Chevallier benefited for his campaign from services by the “Management 
Center of the National Front”, which included leaflets, posters, badges, videos (…), for an 
amount of 92,005 Francs; (…)  
Third, the bimestrial review “Le Toulonnais”, which is the official bulletin of the city of 
Toulon, which has been headed by Mr. Le Chevallier since 1995, published its issue 26 on 20 
May 1997, i.e., five days before the first round of the election. Seven of the 16 pages of that 
issue, including the cover with the title “A crushing report”, gave excerpts of governmental 
reports on the management of the city of Toulon (…) during the 1988-1994 period; this issue 
must be regarded as an instrument of propaganda since it dealt with one of the major themes of 
Mr. Le Chevallier’s campaign against [socialist candidate] Mr. Colin; (…); the amount of these 
seven pages (…) is 26,088 Francs, (…) 
Mr. Colin is therefore correct in asserting that Mr. Le Chevallier’s campaign spending 
account is faulty (…) 
A.3. Excerpt of decision 97-2113/2119/2146/2154/2234/2235/2242/2243 
(….) On the existence of a maneuver in the poll books in the fifth district [of Paris]:  
(…) It results from the investigation, and notably from the Conseil Constitutionel’s inquiry, 
that, in the fifth district [of Paris], a high number of voters were registered as living in public   25
housing owned by the municipality of Paris, even though they are unknown to the agencies 
which manage these buildings; in some cases, it turns out that these individuals actually lived in 
public housing in other Parisian districts; the investigation also showed that some voters resided 
in buildings that were fictitious or unable to accommodate the number of registered voters, and 
that some voters resided in flats that are owned by the mayor’s office of the fifth district of Paris; 
(…)  
It also results from the inquiry that several hundreds of voter ids did not arrive to their 
addressees, even though the latter did not change flats (…);  
All these serious and numerous deeds inside the same district, provide evidence that there 
was a maneuver in the organization of the poll registers; 
However, it results from the inquiry that the number of voters whose registration may be 
fraudulent and who voted in the second round of the election is perceptibly lower than the vote 
differential between the candidates that amounts to 2725 votes; this maneuver might therefore be 
blameworthy, but it did not change the outcome of the elections; (….).   26
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Table 1. Lists of variables 
Dependent variables   
Cancel  =1 if the election is cancelled by the CC; 0 otherwise 
Irregularities  =1 if the CC acknowledged that irregularities occurred during the election; 0 otherwise 
  
Explanatory variables   
   
The CC judges   
Judges_Former_Left-wing_Politicians  Share of former left-wing politicians in the CC 
Judges_Former_Right-wing_Politicians  Share of former right-wing politicians in the CC 
Judges_Civil_servants  Share of former high-level civil servants in the CC 
Judges_Jurists  Share of judges with a specialization in law, i.e., lawyers, law professors 
Judges_appointed_RW  Share of judges nominated by right-wing politicians 
   
The French polity   
Senat  =1 if the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are of opposing parties; 0 otherwise 
Cohabitation  =1 if the upper house of Parliament opposes the policies of the Government; 0 otherwise 
RW_government  =1 if the Government is right-wing; 0 otherwise 
 
The characteristics of the controverted elections 
Vote_Differential  Difference in the number of votes between the winner of the election and the candidate who came second 
Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right  Difference in the number of votes between the winner of the election and the candidate who came second, when the 
winner is a far-right candidate 
1986_Elections  =1  for the 1986 parliamentary election; 0 otherwise 
Algeria  =1 for elections held in Algeria in 1958 under a one-round party list voting system; 0 otherwise 
1_round  =1 if the election was settled in one round; 0 otherwise 
More2candidates  =1 if more than two candidates were present on the second round of the elections; 0 otherwise 
1candidate_2nd_round  =1 if only one candidate was present on the second round of the election; 0 otherwise 
   
The authors of the requests   
Request_Voter  =1 if the election was questioned by a voter in the constituency, not by a candidate; 0 otherwise 
Request_Far_Left  =1 if the election was questioned by a far-left candidate; 0 otherwise 
Request_Com  =1 if the election was questioned by a  candidate from the French Communist Party; 0 otherwise   30 
Request_Main_Left  =1 if the election was questioned by a mainstream left-wing (social-democrat) candidate; 0 otherwise 
Request_LW  =1 if the election was questioned by a left-wing candidate not affiliated with any major left-wing party; 0 otherwise 
Request_Green  =1 if the election was questioned by a  candidate from the left-wing ecologist "Green" party; 0 otherwise 
Request_Independent_Ecologist  =1 if the election was questioned by a independent/apolitical ecologist candidate; 0 otherwise 
Request_Independent  =1 if the election was questioned by an independent/apolitical  candidate; 0 otherwise 
Request_GE  =1 if the election was questioned by a candidate from the right-wing ecologist "Generation Ecologie" party; 0 otherwise 
Request_RW  =1 if the election was questioned by a right-wing candidate not affiliated with any major right-wing party; 0 otherwise 
Request_Main_Right  =1 if the election was questioned by a  candidate from the mainstream right-wing parties; 0 otherwise 
Request_Far_Right  =1 if the election was questioned by a far-right candidate; 0 otherwise 
 
The winners of the controverted elections 
Winner_Election_Com  Number of candidates from the French Communist Party elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_Green  Number of candidates from the left-wing ecologist "Green" Party elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_Main_Left  Number of candidates from the mainstream left-wing (social-democrat) party elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_LW  Number of left-wing candidates not affiliated with a major left-wing party elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_Independent  Number of independent candidates elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_RW  Number of right-wing candidates not affiliated with a right-wing party elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_Main_Right  Number of candidates from the mainstream right-wing parties elected in the constituency 
Winner_Election_Far_Right  Number of candidates from far-right parties elected in the constituency 
 
Note: In 1958 in Algeria, as well as in the 1986 parliamentary elections throughout France, the principle of a single-member representative in each constituency 
was not applied. Instead, several representatives were elected in the constituency. Consequently, the variables Winner_Election_Com, Winner_Election_Green, 
Winner_Election_Main_Left, Winner_Election_LW, Winner_Election_Independent, Winner_Election_RW, Winner_Election_Main_Right and 
Winner_Election_Far_Right are not dummy variables.   31
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Note: There are 999 observations for each variable. 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Dependent variables       
Cancel 0.056  0.230  0  1 
Irregularities 0.411  0.492  0  1 
       
Explanatory variables       
The CC judges       
Judges_Former_Left-wing_Politicians  0.204  0.093 0 0.444 
Judges_Former_Right-wing_Politicians  0.191  0.155 0 0.444 
Judges_Civil_servants  0.117  0.078 0 0.222 
Judges_Jurists  0.519  0.122 0.111 0.778 
Judges_appointed_RW 0.618  0.170  0.333  1 
       
The French polity       
Senat 0.577  0.494  0  1 
Cohabitation 0.311  0.463  0  1 
RW_government 0.806  0.396  0  1 
     
The characteristics of the controverted elections     
Vote_Differential 6521.10  9166.11  1  160924 
Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right 144.94 1968.33  0  34377 
1986_Elections 0.022  0.147  0  1 
Algeria   0.016  0.126  0  1 
1_round 0.113  0.317  0  1 
More2candidates 0.145  0.352  0  1 
1candidate_2nd_round 0.020  0.140  0  1 
       
The authors of the requests       
Request_Voter 0.348  0.477  0  1 
Request_Far_Left 0.010  0.100  0  1 
Request_Com 0.052  0.222  0  1 
Request_Main_Left 0.138  0.345  0  1 
Request_LW 0.042  0.201  0  1 
Request_Green 0.034  0.181  0  1 
Request_Independent_Ecologist 0.003  0.055  0 1 
Request_Independent 0.070  0.255  0  1 
Request_GE 0.005  0.071  0  1 
Request_RW 0.052  0.222  0  1 
Request_Main_Right 0.254  0.436  0  1 
Request_Far_Right 0.126  0.332  0  1 
       
The winners of the controverted elections       
Winner_Election_Com 0.116  0.339  0  4 
Winner_Election_Green 0.002  0.045  0  1 
Winner_Election_Main_Left 0.321  0.635  0  4 
Winner_Election_LW 0.020  0.140  0  1 
Winner_Election_Independent 0.024  0.188  0  4 
Winner_Election_RW 0.033  0.210  0  3 
Winner_Election_Main_Right 0.611  0.644  0  6 
Winner_Election_Far_Right 0.009  0.095  0  1   32
Table 3. Number of valid requests judged by the CC, of elections with acknowledged irregularities and of cancelled 
elections. 






1958  General elections  576  503  106  39  5 
1962  General elections  482  482  63  32  7 
1963  By-elections  5  5  5  1  0 
1967  General elections  486  486  132  27  4 
1968  General elections  487  487  46  25  2 
1969  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1973  General elections  490  490  38  18  2 
1975  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1976  By-elections  2  2  2  0  0 
1978  General elections  491  491  48  20  5 
1980  By-elections  2  2  2  0  0 
1981  General elections  577  577  50  22  4 
1982  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1984  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1986  General elections  577  104  22  5  2 
1988  General elections  577  577  70  36  7 
1989  By-elections  4  4  4  1  0 
1990  By-elections  1  1  1  1  0 
1991  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1992  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
1993  General elections  577  577  142  74  6 
1994  By-elections  2  2  2  1  0 
1995  By-elections  11  11  11  4  0 
1996  By-elections  9  9  9  3  0 
1997  General elections  577  577  135  60  4 
1998  By-elections  4  4  4  4  1 
1999  By-elections  2  2  2  1  0 
2000  By-elections  2  2  2  1  0 
2001  By-elections  1  1  1  0  0 
2002  General elections  577  577  95  35  7 
2003  By-elections  1  1  1  1  0 
 
Note: 
• In the 1958 and in 1986 elections, the number of seats is higher than the number of elections. This is because in 
1958, the members of parliament from Algeria were elected on party lists while in 1986, all the members of 
parliament were elected on party lists.   33
Table 4. Characteristics of the irregular and cancelled elections judged by the Conseil Constitutionnel, 1958-2005 
    Characteristics of cancelled parliamentary elections 
    (Second step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics   Vote_Differential  -2.13E-06 -1.32E-06 -2.09E-06 -1.28E-06 
of the controverted     [1.99E-6] [1.97E-6] [1.98E-6] [1.97E-6] 
elections  1986_elections  0.478  0.601  
    [0.311]   [0.289]**  
  Algeria 0.078  -0.305  0.145  -0.2 
    [0.195] [0.288] [0.197] [0.296] 
  1_round -0.016  -0.003  0  0.012 
    [0.055] [0.055] [0.056] [0.056] 
  More2candidates  -0.094 -0.074 -0.084 -0.065 
    [0.055]*  [0.055] [0.055] [0.054] 
  1candidate_2nd_round  0.169 0.157 0.181 0.171 
    [0.122] [0.121] [0.122] [0.122] 
Winners of the   Winner_Election_Com -0.184  0.024  -0.209  -0.018 
controverted elections   [0.067]***  [0.118]  [0.067]***  [0.121] 
  Winner_Election_Green  -0.307 -0.115 -0.332 -0.156 
    [0.333] [0.345] [0.331] [0.345] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Left -0.074  0.1  -0.09  0.067 
    [0.050]  [0.108] [0.051]* [0.112] 
  Winner_Election_LW  -0.011 0.169 0.019 0.182 
    [0.115] [0.148] [0.124] [0.158] 
  Winner_Election_Independent -0.12  0.038  -0.119  0.022 
    [0.083] [0.117] [0.083] [0.120] 
  Winner_Election_RW  -0.001 0.052 0.002 0.036 
    [0.083] [0.145] [0.082] [0.147] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Right -0.125  0.068  -0.124  0.054 
    [0.049]** [0.109] [0.049]** [0.113] 
  Winner_Election_Far_Right  0.618 0.887 0.634 0.887 
    [0.172]*** [0.203]*** [0.171]*** [0.203]*** 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  0.144  0.179  0.087  0.072 
    [0.349] [0.347] [0.322] [0.320] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  0.36  0.312  0.208  0.193 
    [0.386] [0.384] [0.208] [0.207] 
  Judges_Civil  servants  -0.077 -0.185 -0.057 -0.115 
    [0.381] [0.379] [0.236] [0.235] 
  Judges_Jurists 0.034  0.103  -0.069  -0.077 
    [0.395] [0.394] [0.171] [0.170] 
  Judges_appointed_RW 0.324  0.411  -0.41  -0.363 
    [0.455] [0.455] [0.838] [0.835] 
The French polity  Senat 0.11  0.108     
   [0.067]  [0.066]     
  Cohabitation 0.089  0.095     
   [0.099]  [0.098]     
  RW_government 0.087  0.081     
   [0.088]  [0.088]     
  Constant -0.157  -0.417  0.309  0.156 
    [0.524]  [0.544] [0.142]** [0.171] 
     
  Continuing next page  
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    Characteristics of irregular parliamentary elections 
    (First step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics of   Algeria  0.038 0.036 0.266 0.264 
the controverted     [0.329] [0.328] [0.337] [0.336] 
elections  1_round  0.014 0.014 0.055 0.056 
    [0.135] [0.135] [0.142] [0.142] 
  More2candidates  -0.215 -0.208 -0.127 -0.121 
   [0.125]*  [0.125]*  [0.134]  [0.133] 
  1candidate_2nd_round  -0.23  -0.221 -0.371 -0.362 
    [0.294] [0.294] [0.298] [0.298] 
The authors of  Request_Voter  -0.213 -0.218 -0.154 -0.159 
the requests   [0.110]*  [0.111]**  [0.117]  [0.119] 
  Request_Far_Left 0.041  0.095  0.01  0.056 
    [0.434] [0.448] [0.436] [0.448] 
  Request_Com 0.32  0.31  0.422  0.412 
   [0.199]  [0.199]  [0.204]**  [0.204]** 
  Request_Main_Left  0.73  0.719 0.759 0.748 
    [0.135]*** [0.136]*** [0.145]*** [0.145]*** 
  Request_LW  0.139 0.129 0.188 0.178 
    [0.211] [0.211] [0.213] [0.213] 
  Request_Green  -0.19  -0.194 -0.106 -0.117 
    [0.243] [0.243] [0.269] [0.269] 
  Request_Main_Right  0.443 0.427 0.543 0.526 
    [0.122]*** [0.123]*** [0.129]*** [0.131]*** 
  Request_RW  0.317 0.287 0.267 0.232 
    [0.187]*  [0.190] [0.191] [0.194] 
  Request_Far_Right  0.754 0.716 0.806 0.767 
    [0.141]*** [0.143]*** [0.151]*** [0.154]*** 
  Request_Independent_Ecologist 0.708  0.705  0.76  0.756 
    [0.810] [0.808] [0.825] [0.822] 
  Request_GE  0.126 0.136 0.062 0.075 
    [0.609] [0.608] [0.617] [0.616] 
  Request_Independent  0.062 0.054 0.178 0.169 
    [0.172] [0.172] [0.182] [0.182] 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  1.121  1.124  -0.809  -0.8 
    [0.811] [0.810] [0.818] [0.817] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  -0.937  -0.933  0.37  0.372 
    [0.650] [0.649] [0.538] [0.538] 
  Judges_Civil servants  -0.145  -0.164  0.493  0.467 
    [0.658] [0.658] [0.638] [0.638] 
  Judges_Jurists 0.044  0.049  -0.812  -0.806 
   [0.942]  [0.941]  [0.430]*  [0.430]* 
  Judges_appointed_RW 0.549  0.549  6.12  6.099 
   [1.140]  [1.140]  [2.040]***  [2.039]*** 
  Constant -0.869  -0.857  -0.374  -0.36 
    [1.162] [1.162] [0.334] [0.334] 
        
  λ  -0.042 -0.039 -0.044 -0.047 
    [0.068] [0.07] [0.069]  [0.071] 
  Wald(χ2)  58.36  55.532 65.835 61.849 
  Prob  0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
  Censored  observations    411 406 388 383 
  Uncensored  observations  588 571 556 539 
  Number  of  observations  999 977 944 922   35
Notes: 
• This Table presents the results for the two-step of Heckman’s two-stage estimator on all the elections whose 
validity was discussed by the Conseil Constitutionnel between 1958 and 2005.  
• Column 1 presents the regression results on both general and by-elections whose validity was contested between 
1958 and 2005. Column 2 presents the regression results on both the general and by-elections whose validity was 
contested between 1958 and 2005, excluding those that were held in 1986 following the proportional mode of 
representation. Column 3 presents the regression results on the general elections whose validity was contested 
between 1958 and 2002. Column 4 presents the regression results on the general elections whose validity was 
contested between 1958 and 2002, but excluding those that were held in 1986. 
• In the second step of the regression, we included the Irregularities variable, which indicates the existence of an 
irregularity during the electoral campaign, but eventually had to drop it because of multicollinearity. 
• Standard errors are given in brackets below the coefficients. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5%-level. * indicates significance at the 10%-level.    36
Table 5. Characteristics of the irregular and cancelled elections judged by the Conseil Constitutionnel when a 
majority of the judges was appointed by right-wing politicians. 
    Characteristics of cancelled parliamentary elections 
    (Second step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics   Vote_Differential  -1.96E-06 -1.15E-06 -2.00E-06 -1.14E-06 
of the controverted     [2.31E-6] [2.26E-6] [2.36E-6] [2.32E-6] 
elections  1986_elections  0.251  0.566  
    [0.398]   [0.330]*  
  Algeria  0.087 -0.327 0.112 -0.271 
    [0.227] [0.359] [0.222] [0.366] 
  1_round -0.015  0  0.009  0.021 
    [0.076] [0.076] [0.074] [0.074] 
  More2candidates  -0.155 -0.124 -0.157 -0.125 
   [0.077]**  [0.078]  [0.071]**  [0.073]* 
  1candidate_2nd_round  0.268 0.274 0.289 0.296 
    [0.260] [0.258] [0.253] [0.252] 
Winners of the   Winner_Election_Com -0.214  0.01  -0.265  -0.055 
controverted elections   [0.081]***  [0.153]  [0.080]***  [0.158] 
  Winner_Election_Green  -0.309 -0.104 -0.326 -0.137 
    [0.359] [0.380] [0.348] [0.373] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Left -0.064  0.119  -0.084  0.086 
    [0.062] [0.141] [0.061] [0.146] 
  Winner_Election_LW  0.152 0.354 0.189 0.378 
   [0.189]  [0.226]  [0.181]  [0.222]* 
  Winner_Election_Independent -0.14  0.029  -0.131  0.023 
    [0.092] [0.144] [0.091] [0.146] 
  Winner_Election_RW  0.042 -0.027 0.052 -0.023 
    [0.113] [0.230] [0.109] [0.229] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Right -0.161  0.048  -0.153  0.043 
   [0.059]***  [0.145]  [0.058]***  [0.150] 
  Winner_Election_Far_Right  0.565 0.82 0.582  0.825 
   [0.222]**  [0.261]***  [0.216]***  [0.254]*** 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  -0.202  -0.137  0.392  0.413 
    [0.547] [0.544] [0.405] [0.405] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  1.016  0.935  -0.075  -0.094 
    [0.863] [0.860] [0.258] [0.259] 
  Judges_Civil servants  0.634  0.528  0.32  0.264 
    [0.757] [0.754] [0.567] [0.567] 
  Judges_Jurists  -0.491 -0.473 -0.145 -0.145 
    [0.306] [0.304] [0.198] [0.198] 
The French polity  Senat 0.238  0.229     
   [0.205]  [0.203]     
  Cohabitation 0.384  0.375     
   [0.284]  [0.282]     
  RW_government 0.191  0.164     
   [0.129]  [0.128]     
  Constant 0.007  -0.148  0.42  0.253 
    [0.316]  [0.337] [0.202]** [0.242] 
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    Characteristics of irregular parliamentary elections 
    (First step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics of  Algeria  0.155 0.151 0.243 0.238 
the controverted     [0.337] [0.336] [0.339] [0.338] 
elections  1st_victory 0.031  0.035  0.116  0.12 
    [0.171] [0.171] [0.176] [0.176] 
  More2candidates -0.189  -0.175  -0.134  -0.12 
    [0.152] [0.152] [0.157] [0.157] 
  1candidate_2nd_round 0.062  0.068  -0.006  -0.002 
    [0.617] [0.616] [0.618] [0.618] 
The authors of  Request_Voter  -0.358 -0.375 -0.332 -0.345 
the requests    [0.143]** [0.147]** [0.147]** [0.151]** 
  Request_Far_Left -0.108  0.039  -0.122  0.019 
    [0.643] [0.683] [0.642] [0.682] 
  Request_Com  0.284 0.259 0.305 0.281 
    [0.212] [0.213] [0.213] [0.214] 
  Request_Main_Left 0.675  0.651  0.684  0.66 
   [0.171]***  [0.173]***  [0.178]***  [0.179]*** 
  Request_LW 0.125  0.104  0.15  0.129 
    [0.236] [0.237] [0.238] [0.239] 
  Request_Green  -0.158 -0.186 -0.129 -0.157 
    [0.481] [0.482] [0.480] [0.480] 
  Request_Main_Right  0.326 0.287 0.373 0.336 
   [0.154]**  [0.158]*  [0.157]**  [0.161]** 
  Request_RW  0.263 0.225 0.197 0.154 
    [0.230] [0.236] [0.235] [0.241] 
  Request_Far_Right 0.499  0.398  0.492  0.39 
    [0.202]** [0.211]* [0.205]** [0.214]* 
  Request_Independent  0.029 0.008 0.091 0.071 
    [0.229] [0.230] [0.237] [0.238] 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  1.26  1.291  0.069  0.111 
    [0.847] [0.847] [0.996] [0.995] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  -0.028  -0.022  0.26  0.264 
    [0.604] [0.603] [0.624] [0.624] 
  Judges_Civil servants  2.742  2.714  1.823  1.8 
   [1.324]**  [1.323]**  [1.385]  [1.384] 
  Judges_Jurists  -0.151 -0.133 -0.571 -0.552 
    [0.439] [0.439] [0.459] [0.459] 
  Constant  -0.962 -0.939 -0.603 -0.584 
   [0.391]**  [0.392]**  [0.408]  [0.408] 
        
  λ  -0.104 -0.103 -0.108 -0.122 
    [0.109] [0.113] [0.108] [0.113] 
  Wald(χ2)  42.098 36.876 42.791 36.285 
  Prob  0.07  0.122 0.027 0.067 
  Censored  observations    229 224 218 213 
  Uncensored  observations  393 376 383 366 
  Number  of  observations  622 600 601 579 
 
Notes:• This Table presents the results for the two-step of Heckman’s two-stage estimator on all the elections whose 
validity was discussed by the Conseil Constitutionnel when a majority of judges was appointed by right-wing 
politicians, i.e., from 1958 to 1986, and from 2002 to 2005.    38
• Column 1 presents the regression results on both general and by-elections which were controverted from 1958 to 
1986, and from 2002 to 2005. Column 2 presents the regression results on both the general and by-elections which 
were controverted from 1958 to 1981 and from 2002 to 2005, i.e., excluding the 1986 parliamentary elections that 
were held following the proportional voting system. Column 3 presents the regression results on the controverted 
general elections, from 1958 to 1986, and in 2002. Column 4 presents the regression results on the controverted 
general elections, from 1958 to 1981 and in 2002, i.e., excluding the 1986 parliamentary elections. 
• In the second step of the regression, we included the Irregularities variable, which indicates the existence of an 
irregularity during the electoral campaign, but eventually had to drop it because of multicollinearity. 
• Standard errors are given in brackets below the coefficients. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5%-level. * indicates significance at the 10%-level.    39
Table 6. Characteristics of the irregular and cancelled elections judged by the Conseil Constitutionnel and the 
elections won by far-right candidates, 1958-2005 
    Characteristics of cancelled parliamentary elections 
    (Second step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics   Vote_Differential_Winner_Far_Right -9.62E-5 -1.40E-05  -8.78E-05  -5.48E-06 
of the controverted     [6.08E-5] [7.92E-5] [6.07E-5] [7.87E-5] 
elections  Vote_Differential  -1.45E-06 -2.08E-06 -2.12E-06 -1.49E-06 
    [1.97E-6] [1.98E-6] [1.99E-6] [1.97E-6] 
  1986_elections  0.373  0.502  
   [0.318]    [0.296]*   
  Algeria    -0.008 -0.302 0.064 -0.199 
    [0.202] [0.288] [0.204] [0.296] 
  1_round -0.014  -0.003  0.003  0.012 
    [0.055] [0.055] [0.056] [0.056] 
  More2candidates  -0.092 -0.074 -0.082 -0.065 
   [0.055]*  [0.055]  [0.054]  [0.054] 
  1candidate_2nd_round  0.169 0.157 0.183 0.171 
    [0.122] [0.121] [0.122] [0.122] 
Winners of the   Winner_Election_Com -0.143  0.022  -0.171  -0.018 
controverted     [0.071]** [0.118] [0.072]** [0.122] 
elections  Winner_Election_Green  -0.264 -0.116 -0.293 -0.157 
    [0.333] [0.345] [0.331] [0.345] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Left -0.036  0.098  -0.055  0.067 
    [0.056] [0.108] [0.056] [0.112] 
  Winner_Election_LW  0.029 0.168 0.055 0.182 
    [0.118] [0.148] [0.127] [0.158] 
  Winner_Election_Independent -0.086  0.037  -0.088  0.021 
    [0.085] [0.117] [0.086] [0.120] 
  Winner_Election_RW  0.023 0.051 0.025 0.035 
    [0.084] [0.145] [0.084] [0.148] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Right -0.082  0.067  -0.084  0.053 
    [0.055] [0.109] [0.056] [0.113] 
  Winner_Election_Far_Right  1.125 0.946 1.096  0.91 
   [0.363]***  [0.391]**  [0.362]***  [0.389]** 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  0.151  0.178  0.092  0.073 
    [0.348] [0.347] [0.321] [0.320] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  0.348  0.313  0.188  0.193 
    [0.385] [0.384] [0.208] [0.208] 
  Judges_Civil  servants  -0.102 -0.186 -0.083 -0.116 
    [0.380] [0.379] [0.236] [0.236] 
  Judges_Jurists 0.04  0.101  -0.074  -0.077 
    [0.394] [0.394] [0.171] [0.170] 
  Judges_appointed_RW 0.348  0.41  -0.488  -0.368 
    [0.454] [0.455] [0.838] [0.838] 
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The French polity  Senat 0.113  0.109     
   [0.067]*  [0.066]     
  Cohabitation 0.09  0.095     
   [0.099]  [0.098]     
  RW_government 0.09  0.081     
   [0.088]  [0.088]     
  Constant -0.214  -0.413  0.286  0.157 
   [0.523]  [0.545]  [0.142]**  [0.172] 
    
    Characteristics of irregular parliamentary elections 
    (First step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics of   Algeria    0.038 0.036 0.266 0.264 
the controverted     [0.329] [0.328] [0.337] [0.336] 
elections  1_round  0.014 0.014 0.055 0.056 
    [0.135] [0.135] [0.142] [0.142] 
  More2candidates  -0.215 -0.208 -0.127 -0.121 
   [0.125]*  [0.125]*  [0.134]  [0.133] 
  1candidate_2nd_round -0.23  -0.221  -0.371  -0.362 
    [0.294] [0.294] [0.298] [0.298] 
The authors of  Request_Voter  -0.213 -0.218 -0.154 -0.159 
the requests   [0.110]*  [0.111]**  [0.117]  [0.119] 
  Request_Far_Left 0.041  0.095  0.01  0.056 
    [0.434] [0.448] [0.436] [0.448] 
  Request_Com 0.32  0.31  0.422  0.412 
   [0.199]  [0.199]  [0.204]**  [0.204]** 
  Request_Main_Left 0.73  0.719  0.759  0.748 
    [0.135]*** [0.136]*** [0.145]*** [0.145]*** 
  Request_LW  0.139 0.129 0.188 0.178 
    [0.211] [0.211] [0.213] [0.213] 
  Request_Green -0.19  -0.194  -0.106  -0.117 
    [0.243] [0.243] [0.269] [0.269] 
  Request_Main_Right  0.443 0.427 0.543 0.526 
    [0.122]*** [0.123]*** [0.129]*** [0.131]*** 
  Request_RW  0.317 0.287 0.267 0.232 
   [0.187]*  [0.190]  [0.191]  [0.194] 
  Request_Far_Right  0.754 0.716 0.806 0.767 
    [0.141]*** [0.143]*** [0.151]*** [0.154]*** 
  Request_Independent_Ecologist 0.708  0.705  0.76  0.756 
    [0.810] [0.808] [0.825] [0.822] 
  Request_GE  0.126 0.136 0.062 0.075 
    [0.609] [0.608] [0.617] [0.616] 
  Request_Independent  0.062 0.054 0.178 0.169 
    [0.172] [0.172] [0.182] [0.182] 
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The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  1.121  1.124  -0.809  -0.8 
    [0.811] [0.810] [0.818] [0.817] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  -0.937  -0.933  0.37  0.372 
    [0.650] [0.649] [0.538] [0.538] 
  Judges_Civil servants  -0.145  -0.164  0.493  0.467 
    [0.658] [0.658] [0.638] [0.638] 
  Judges_Jurists 0.044  0.049  -0.812  -0.806 
   [0.942]  [0.941]  [0.430]*  [0.430]* 
  Judges_appointed_RW 0.549  0.549  6.12  6.099 
   [1.140]  [1.140]  [2.040]***  [2.039]*** 
  Constant  -0.869 -0.857 -0.374  -0.36 
    [1.162] [1.162] [0.334] [0.334] 
        
  λ  -0.045 -0.04 -0.048  -0.047 
   [0.068]  [0.07]  [0.069]  [0.071] 
  Wald(χ2)  61.118 55.565 68.134 61.854 
  Prob  0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 
  Censored  observations    411 406 388 383 
  Uncensored  observations  588 571 556 539 
   Number  of  observations  999 977 944 922 
 
Notes: 
• This Table presents the results for the two-step of Heckman’s two-stage estimator on all the elections whose validity was 
discussed by the Conseil Constitutionnel between 1958 and 2005, where the regressions include an interaction variable 
between the elections won by far-right candidates and the vote differential in the controverted elections.  
• Column 1 presents the regression results on both general and by-elections whose validity was contested between 1958 and 
2005. Column 2 presents the regression results on both the general and by-elections whose validity was contested between 
1958 and 2005, excluding those that were held in 1986 following the proportional mode of representation. Column 3 presents 
the regression results on the general elections whose validity was contested between 1958 and 2002. Column 4 presents the 
regression results only on the general elections whose validity was contested between 1958 and 2002, but excluding those 
that were held in 1986. 
• In the second step of the regression, we included the Irregularities variable, which indicates the existence of an irregularity 
during the electoral campaign, but eventually had to drop it because of multicollinearity. 
• Standard errors are given in brackets below the coefficients. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5%-level. * indicates significance at the 10%-level.    42
Table 7. Characteristics of the irregular and cancelled elections judged by the Conseil Constitutionnel when right-wing 
governments were in power. 
 
    Characteristics of cancelled parliamentary elections 
    (Second step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics of   Vote_Differential  -1.17E-06 -2.00E-06 -1.32E-06 -2.13E-06 
the controverted    [2.10E-6] [2.11E-6] [1.97E-6] [1.99E-6] 
elections  1986_elections 0.632    0.6   
   [0.368]*    [0.289]**   
  Algeria   0.067  -0.292  0.145  -0.2 
    [0.206] [0.320] [0.197] [0.296] 
  1_round -0.018  -0.004  0  0.012 
    [0.063] [0.063] [0.056] [0.056] 
  More2candidates  -0.166 -0.146 -0.084 -0.065 
   [0.073]**  [0.072]**  [0.055]  [0.054] 
  1candidate_2nd_round  0.053 0.036 0.181 0.171 
    [0.135] [0.134] [0.122] [0.122] 
Winners of the   Winner_Election_Com  -0.167 0.04 -0.209  -0.018 
controverted   [0.075]**  [0.135]  [0.067]***  [0.121] 
elections  Winner_Election_Green -0.28  -0.093  -0.332  -0.156 
    [0.343] [0.359] [0.331] [0.345] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Left -0.086  0.077  -0.09  0.067 
   [0.056]  [0.124]  [0.051]*  [0.112] 
  Winner_Election_LW -0.021  0.154  0.019  0.182 
    [0.120] [0.161] [0.124] [0.158] 
  Winner_Election_Independent -0.125  0.024  -0.119  0.022 
    [0.086] [0.129] [0.083] [0.120] 
  Winner_Election_RW  0.002 0.042 0.002 0.036 
    [0.086] [0.159] [0.082] [0.147] 
  Winner_Election_Main_Right -0.114  0.073  -0.124  0.054 
    [0.053]** [0.125] [0.049]** [0.113] 
  Winner_Election_Far_Right  0.536 0.817 0.634 0.887 
   [0.212]**  [0.247]***  [0.171]***  [0.203]*** 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  -0.335  -0.354  0.087  0.072 
    [0.545] [0.538] [0.322] [0.320] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  0.708  0.697  0.208  0.193 
    [0.440] [0.437] [0.208] [0.207] 
  Judges_Civil servants  0.427  0.355  -0.057  -0.115 
    [0.546] [0.542] [0.236] [0.235] 
  Judges_Jurists  -1.169 -1.2 -0.069  -0.077 
    [0.883] [0.875] [0.171] [0.170] 
  Judges_appointed_RW  -1.121 -1.161 -0.411 -0.363 
    [1.054] [1.044] [0.839] [0.835] 
The French polity  Senat 0.145  0.144     
   [0.081]*  [0.081]*     
  Cohabitation 0.015  0.013     
   [0.137]  [0.136]     
  Constant  1.394 1.276 0.309 0.156 
   [1.113]  [1.110]  [0.142]**  [0.171] 
        
  Continuing next page      
          43
    Characteristics of irregular parliamentary elections 
    (First step of Heckman's two-step method) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The characteristics of  Algeria    0.087 0.075 0.266 0.264 
the controverted     [0.330] [0.331] [0.336] [0.336] 
elections  1_round  0.042 0.038 0.055 0.056 
    [0.155] [0.155] [0.142] [0.142] 
  More2candidates  -0.332 -0.333 -0.126 -0.121 
   [0.143]**  [0.145]**  [0.132]  [0.133] 
  1candidate_2nd_round  -0.209 -0.2 -0.371  -0.362 
    [0.321] [0.322] [0.298] [0.298] 
The authors of  Request_Voter -0.26  -0.27  -0.154  -0.159 
the requests   [0.124]**  [0.126]**  [0.117]  [0.119] 
  Request_Far_Left  0.009 0.069 0.009 0.056 
    [0.434] [0.449] [0.435] [0.448] 
  Request_Com  0.374 0.356 0.422 0.412 
   [0.209]*  [0.210]*  [0.204]**  [0.204]** 
 Request_Main_Left 0.701  0.68  0.76  0.748 
    [0.154]*** [0.156]*** [0.145]*** [0.145]*** 
  Request_LW  0.151 0.129 0.188 0.178 
    [0.238] [0.239] [0.212] [0.213] 
  Request_Green  -0.113 -0.129 -0.106 -0.117 
    [0.276] [0.276] [0.269] [0.269] 
 Request_Main_Right  0.469  0.44  0.543  0.526 
    [0.136]*** [0.138]*** [0.129]*** [0.131]*** 
  Request_RW  0.402 0.372 0.267 0.232 
   [0.207]*  [0.212]*  [0.191]  [0.194] 
  Request_Far_Right  0.689 0.643 0.806 0.767 
    [0.152]*** [0.155]*** [0.151]*** [0.154]*** 
  Request_Independent_Ecologist -5.434  -5.474  0.762  0.756 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.824] [0.822] 
  Request_GE -0.231  -0.218  0.062  0.075 
    [0.671] [0.669] [0.617] [0.616] 
  Request_Independent  0.032 0.012 0.179 0.169 
    [0.200] [0.202] [0.181] [0.182] 
The CC judges  Judges_Former Left-wing Politicians  -0.907  -0.622  -0.823  -0.8 
    [0.946] [1.149] [0.693] [0.817] 
  Judges_Former Right-wing Politicians  0.325  0.271  0.368  0.372 
    [0.779] [0.790] [0.535] [0.538] 
  Judges_Civil  servants  0.979 1.117 0.494 0.467 
    [1.288] [1.333] [0.638] [0.638] 
  Judges_Jurists  -2.755 -2.621 -0.815 -0.806 
   [1.352]**  [1.386]*  [0.417]*  [0.430]* 
 Judges_appointed_RW  -3.136  -2.991  6.137  6.099 
   [1.709]*  [1.745]*  [1.970]***  [2.039]*** 
  Constant 2.908  2.724  -0.37  -0.36 
   [1.698]*  [1.764]  [0.315]  [0.334] 
       
  λ  -0.005 -0.012 -0.044 -0.047 
    [0.081] [0.083] [0.069] [0.071] 
  Wald(χ2)  44.533 41.727 65.843 61.849 
  Prob  0.043 0.059 0.000 0.000 
  Censored  observations    323 318 388 383 
  Uncensored  observations  482 465 556 539 
  Number  of  observations  805 783 944 922   44
Notes: 
• This Table presents the results for the two-step of Heckman’s two-stage estimator on all the elections whose 
validity was discussed by the Conseil Constitutionnel when right-governments were in power, i.e., between 1958 
and 1981, 1986 and 1988, 1993 and 1997, 2002 and 2005.  
• Column 1 presents the regression results on both general and by-elections whose validity was contested between 
1958 and 2005. Column 2 presents the regression results on both the general and by-elections whose validity was 
contested between 1958 and 2005, excluding those that were held in 1986 following the proportional mode of 
representation. Column 3 presents the regression results on the general elections whose validity was contested 
between 1958 and 2002. Column 4 presents the regression results on the general elections whose validity was 
contested between 1958 and 2002, but excluding those that were held in 1986. 
• In the second step of the regression, we included the Irregularities variable, which indicates the existence of an 
irregularity during the electoral campaign, but eventually had to drop it because of multicollinearity. 
• Standard errors are given in brackets below the coefficients. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5%-level. * indicates significance at the 10%-level.  
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Figure 1. Shares of judges appointed by mainstream left-wing and mainstream right-wing politicians sitting on the 
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